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Secure optical communication using a quantum
alarm
Yupeng Gong1, Rupesh Kumar2, Adrian Wonfor 1, Shengjun Ren1, Richard V. Penty1 and Ian H. White1,3
Abstract
Optical fibre networks are advancing rapidly to meet growing traffic demands. Security issues, including attack
management, have become increasingly important for optical communication networks because of the vulnerabilities
associated with tapping light from optical fibre links. Physical layer security often requires restricting access to channels
and periodic inspections of link performance. In this paper, we report how quantum communication techniques can
be utilized to detect a physical layer attack. We present an efficient method for monitoring the physical layer security
of a high-data-rate classical optical communication network using a modulated continuous-variable quantum signal.
We describe the theoretical and experimental underpinnings of this monitoring system and the monitoring accuracy
for different monitored parameters. We analyse its performance for both unamplified and amplified optical links. The
technique represents a novel approach for applying quantum signal processing to practical optical communication
networks and compares well with classical monitoring methods. We conclude by discussing the challenges facing its
practical application, its differences with respect to existing quantum key distribution methods, and its usage in future
secure optical transport network planning.
Introduction
The evolution of current optical communication sys-
tems towards highly diverse, flexible networks with broad
coverage for mission-critical applications has made
channel security a critical issue. As described in ref. 1, we
may define two types of security in optical communica-
tion networks: physical layer security and semantic
security. High semantic security ensures that an adversary
is not able to compute any communications information
from a ciphertext, while physical layer security protects
channels by ensuring data privacy.
Current classical attack detection methods
To date, several fibre surveillance, in-service monitoring
or active fibre monitoring methods have been devised2–5
to protect channels from physical layer attacks6–8. There
are generally two categories of attack detection techni-
ques, based on their working principles7,9: (1) methods
that rely on additional statistical analysis of the commu-
nications signals (e.g., mean optical power monitoring, bit
error rate (BER) measurement and optical spectrum
analysis (OSA)) and (2) methods that rely on sending a
special signal devoted to investigative purposes (e.g.,
optical time-domain reflectometry (OTDR) and pilot
tones). The parameters that are monitored to ensure
security indicate the degree to which security is violated.
Methods of the first kind are often too slow to detect an
attack that lasts for only a few seconds6. In addition, it is
possible to maintain the link power while splitting off part
of the information using a correlated jamming attack9,10.
For a method of the second kind, if the act of attack
causes significant degradation of the probe signal, then
the tapped channel will also be affected, and vice versa6,11.
In addition, although OTDR12 can locate a fault in a
channel, its sensitivity (0.01 dB/km4 or 0.5 dB/dB loss3) is
usually too poor to detect a sophisticated eavesdropper,
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who will usually cause a loss change of less than 0.1 dB1 at
a long distance. Regarding jamming attacks, none of the
above methods is sensitive to channel noise, and they
cannot detect a jamming attack, unless the noise causes
significant degradation of the signal, resulting in many
corrupted bits, or the noise significantly affects the pilot
tone/probe signal.
Quantum techniques for secure communication
On the other hand, quantum techniques, particularly
those focused on quantum key distribution (QKD)13,14
and quantum secure direct communication (QSDC)15–17,
seek to ensure security by using information-theoretical
secure techniques rather than by relying on computa-
tional complexity. A fundamental problem with classical
monitoring, as analysed in18,19 and experimentally rea-
lized in20, is that the classical nature of current optical
communication signals allows an attacker to eavesdrop
and then resend an identical replica without detection by
legitimate users. This kind of attack is known as a man-in-
the-middle attack or an intercept-resend attack.
In contrast, quantum communication techniques, which
employ the no-cloning theorem21, are able to eliminate
the threat of this kind of attack. For instance, both QKD,
which is capable of distilling secret key material with an
arbitrarily small upper bound on the amount of infor-
mation that is accessible to an eavesdropper, and QSDC,
which conveys secure information or deterministic key
information directly22 based on Wyner’s wiretap theory23,
consist of an error-check or error estimation step, in
which legitimate users are able to check for the presence
of any eavesdropper on a quantum communication
channel using part of the quantum signals received before
the distillation of a secure key or the communication of a
secure message.
Quantum techniques for physical layer security
There are also applications that use quantum techni-
ques to protect physical layer security24. proposes a
quantum method for protecting line-of-sight channel
security. Alternatively, in ref. 18, the system monitors the
security of the physical layer via a separate reference
channel by performing an entanglement test on the
received photons, something that is difficult to imple-
ment in practice. In25, quantum data locking is used to
transmit messages at a higher rate with compromised
security26. proposes a theoretical method of confidential
communication using continuous-variable quantum
states27, in which part of the sent quantum states are used
to monitor the security of an ideal channel. Recently,
efforts have also been made to use quantum techniques
to protect high-data-rate classical communication, e.g.,
using quantum low probability of intercept28 and a
spectral approach29.
In this paper, therefore, we report a novel technique that
we call a quantum alarm (QA), which focuses on mon-
itoring the physical layer security of optical fibre links using
quantum techniques. Unlike QKD systems, which are
challenging to implement in high-data-rate classical optical
communication networks, a QA system can be integrated
directly into a high-speed classical communication system,
even one that incorporates optical amplifiers. It provides
efficient, real-time, long-distance, and low-cost security
monitoring. In this work, the QA concept is implemented
using a technique relying on continuous variable-(CV)
based quantum communications30, as this allows equip-
ment similar to that applied in classical coherent com-
munications systems to be used and hence allows the
envisaged system to be low in cost.
Results
Monitoring principle and protocol
In a method similar to that used in pilot tone systems,
the link security is checked by sending special signals,
which, in this case, comprise CV quantum states, i.e., weak
coherent states modulated at the quantum level. They are
sensitive to any unauthorized measurement in the channel,
which will be detected, as this introduces extra noise.
Hence, as illustrated in Fig. 1, our proposed system has
two modes: (i) when sending a quantum-modulated sig-
nal, the system is in the security checking mode (SCM),
and (ii) it is in the classical communication mode (CCM)
when sending classical data signals.
To make these two modes indistinguishable by an
eavesdropper without attacking the quantum signal, one
may transmit both modes simultaneously, as described in
ref. 31 and experimentally realized in ref. 32, in which QKD
and classical coherently modulated signals were trans-
mitted simultaneously using a displaced quantum signal
so that there would be no question of distinguishability.
However, the small bandwidth and the measurement
range of a typical quantum detector limit the practical
application of such a system. Hence, in this work, the
transmitter switches randomly between the SCM and
CCM using optical time-division multiplexing (OTDM).
Moreover, we also send the signals over the same channel
and at the same wavelength. Given its very low intensity,
the quantum-modulated signal should be amplitude dis-
placed in the phase space to increase its intensity to the
classical level of zeros in classical communication. As a
result, to an eavesdropper, the quantum signal will appear
as a short burst of zeros. To further increase the indis-
tinguishability, some additional short bursts of zeros
could be introduced during the CCM. Alternatively, Alice
could insert quantum signals by replacing all classical
zeros such that an eavesdropper cannot identify the SCM
by looking for zeros. One could further increase the
intensity of the quantum-modulated signal at the price of
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additional detection complexity. A detailed analysis on
this topic can be found in the Supplementary Information.
The receiver uses either homodyne or heterodyne detec-
tion to measure the either in phase or quadrature compo-
nents of the coherent states (X or P) individually or both. A
strong local oscillator (LO) pulse (more than 108 photons
per pulse), which can be transmitted with the signal or
generated locally at the receiver33, is employed to detect the
information encoded in the quantum modulations.
The information stored in the SCM, along with its
position, will be sent via the CCM after a short period of
time. The classical receiver decodes the information and
passes it to the quantum receiver, which then retains only
the measurement results for the quantum signal. This
procedure is designed to avoid sending additional header
information that reveals the slot information, which may
introduce security vulnerabilities. Since no restrictions are
placed on the classical detection system in the QA system,
the classical channel can have a much higher data rate.
The security is continuously checked by comparing the
quadrature values encoded in the quantum state received
by Bob and sent by Alice. An attack is found to have taken
place when the excess quantum noise ξ and the real-time
channel transmittance T estimated from the quantum
states exceeds a given threshold set by the user. Once the
link is regarded as unsafe after the SCM, the succeeding
CCM is halted, and communication is restored using an
alternative secure link in the network.
As mentioned in the introduction, this method of
security checking is also employed in QKD and QSDC.
However, data reconciliation34 and privacy amplifica-
tion35 for key generation are not required. In addition, in
QKD, only part of Alice’s quadratures are revealed to Bob
for parameter estimation, while in QA monitoring, all
states are used for security checking. The SCM signal can
be generated using any of the various modulation tech-
niques proposed in CV-QKD research to encode variables
with weak coherent states, e.g., discrete modulation36 or
Gaussian modulation37. Displacement in amplitude can
be added via the method proposed in38.
Monitoring accuracy in amplified and unamplified links
In a manner similar to that for QKD post-processing,
the QA monitoring accuracy is also influenced by the
finite size effect39. We can derive the monitoring accuracy
based on the length of the data. For an unamplified link,
the accuracy can be written as:
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where VA is the modulation variance of the quantum signal,
m is the monitoring block length, ZϵPE
2
is the confidence level
and σ2 is the unknown noise variance and is given by
σ2 ¼ 1þ ηT ξ þ Vele. The noise variance is normalized to
the pre-calibrated system shot noise units (snu).
Quantum
modulation
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Multiplex
Classical ASK signal
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receiver
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data
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data
Channel
safe?
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Fig. 1 Block diagram of an example quantum alarm system. The blue signal represents a classical signal using an amplitude shift keying (ASK)
modulation scheme. The violet signal represents a displaced quantum-modulated signal whose length is less than that of the maximum number of
sequential zeros permitted in the classical modulation scheme. The quantum transmitter consists of an amplitude and phase modulator, while the
quantum receiver is a low-bandwidth homodyne/heterodyne detector. A splitter is used at the receiver such that both the quantum and classical
receivers measure the incoming signal. The system switches between transmitting the classical signal and the quantum signal. The quantum signal is
used to check the link security
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Normally, in quantum key distribution, fibre amplifiers
cannot be used to extend the transmission distance because
the excess noise destroys the quantum information stored
in the quantum states and introduces security loopholes40.
Only a single pre-amplifier can be used to compensate for
the efficiency loss of the detector. The modelling of the
noise introduced into quantum states by amplifiers has
been studied extensively; see refs. 41,42. Here, we consider
only a quantum-noise-limited phase-insensitive amplifier
(PIA)43,44, which adds a minimal 2(g2− 1) vacuum noise
units for a given amplitude gain g, and a classical amplifier
(EDFA)45 that adds 2nspðg2  1Þ unit of shot noise, where
nsp is the population inversion coefficient.
To analyse the overall performance, we assume an
amplified channel that consists of several segments of 50
km each, where the amplifier compensates for the fibre
loss and the total gain is unity. The data encoded in the
quantum states after n fibre spans at the receiver can be
modelled as:
y0n ¼ ðg
ffiffiffiffi
T
p
Þn ffiffiffiηp xþ z0 ð3Þ
where g
ffiffiffiffi
T
p ¼ 1 and z’ is a noise term that follows a
normal distribution with variance σ 02n , which can be
written as:
σ 02n ¼ 2nsp g2  1
 þ g2Tη ξ þ σ 02n1 þ Vele ð4Þ
The simulation results for both amplified and unam-
plified links are shown in Fig. 2, where we calculate the
monitoring accuracy for the two parameters of interest as
functions of distance for monitoring block lengths of 105,
106, and 107 with different system parameters. We con-
sider two different receiver system conditions: (i) a typical
classical system receiver whose system parameters are
taken from a classical communication system, which has a
high bandwidth (>10 GHz) and is relatively low in cost,
and (ii) a quantum system receiver whose parameters are
taken from the CV-QKD system (>10MHz) in35, which is
relatively expensive.
For an unamplified link, we can see that the monitoring
data block length and loss are the major factors that
influence the QA monitoring performance and that the
QA system is comparable to the classical system. In
addition, the excess noise monitoring performance drops
exponentially with distance, with an uncertainty exceed-
ing one snu at longer distances, while the loss monitoring
performance remains better than that of the best classical
monitoring system (±0.1 dB) at 100 km.
For an amplified link, in terms of loss monitoring, the
monitoring accuracy is better than ±0.02 dB after three
stages of amplification (200 km) and is far superior to that
of the classical monitoring methods, e.g., OTDR, whose
accuracy is approximately ±0.05 dB/dB4. Regarding the
excess noise monitoring performance, the improvement is
even more obvious. We predict a monitoring accuracy of
0.2 shot noise units at 200 km. As a result, we find that the
additional excess noise does not cause the QA monitoring
performance to degrade. This is because, although the
amplification adds extra noise, a noisy version of the
quantum signal does not cause the accuracy to degrade as
severely as the loss. This is a suprising result that shows
excellent potential for the application of the QA approach
in amplified optical links.
Proof-of-principle experiment
The first demonstration of the monitoring performance
using the quantum-modulated signal is for a channel with
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Fig. 2 Monitoring uncertainty at different distance. Monitoring uncertainty for channel loss (a) and quantum excess noise (b). For the classical
system, the electronic noise is 0.4 shot noise, and the excess channel noise is 0.1 shot noise. For the quantum system, the electronic noise is
0.015 shot noise, and the excess channel noise is 0.01 shot noise. The PIA is a quantum-limited phase-insensitive amplifier. The inversion factor of the
EDFA is set to 1.5. The detector efficiency is set to 0.4. The accuracy results for the classical monitoring system are as follows: ±0.1 dB for optical mean
power monitoring (OMPM)2, ±0.5 dB for optical spectral analysis (OSA)3, 0.4 dB at 50km for a pilot tone3, and moderate sensitivity at a short distance
(0.1 dB) but poor sensitivity at a long distance (0.05 0dB/dB)4,9 for OTDR. The noise is normalized to units of system shot noise (snu)
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a 10 dB loss. The monitoring uncertainty and how it
changes during an emulated fibre tapping attack are tes-
ted. For simplicity, in this proof-of-principle demonstra-
tion experiment, we employ the displaced two-state
modulation scheme, which is equivalent to two-state
modulation46,47, as proven in ref. 31. This modulation can
be effectively generated with a single amplitude mod-
ulator. In addition, we send quantum signals periodically
with pre-shared knowledge of which time slots are
designated for the SCM. The equivalent modulation var-
iance is calculated as VA= 2α
2, where α is the difference
between the two states, as illustrated in Fig. 3. The post-
processing method is the same as the Gaussian modula-
tion scheme. In the experiment, the modulation variance
is set to 20 snu, i.e., α ¼ ffiffiffiffiffi10p .
Hence, as shown in Fig. 3, the quantum signal has two
very close levels, which we refer to as states alpha and
beta, transmitted in succession. We send the QA signal
and the classical signal in different time slots with pulse
widths of 10 ns and slot durations of 40 ns. Hence, the
repetition rate of the quantum signal is 25MHz, and the
data rate of the classical signal is 1 Gb/s. The set-up for
realizing the monitoring scheme is illustrated in Fig. 4. A
detailed introduction to the set-up and the calibration
process can be found in the methods section.
Notably, as a result of small variations in the physical
environment, the fibre channel characteristics change
slightly over time. To evaluate the monitoring accuracy,
we first characterize the factors that influence the
received signal, which include the channel character-
istics, the input signal fluctuations at the transmitter, the
LO power fluctuations at the receiver, and the detector
imbalance.
First, to remove fluctuations in the output current for
heterodyne detection caused by the LO and signal fluc-
tuations, we continuously monitor the input power and
the LO power by using two photodetectors to measure
10% of the LO light and signal light. In addition, the
quantum efficiencies of the two photodiodes inside one
balanced detector will be slightly different in practice.
We balance them by slightly misaligning the detector with
the higher η to reduce its efficiency to match the lower
one. We also test the responses of the two balanced
detectors, which should also be close to ensure stable
heterodyne detection. We then consider that the
remaining fluctuations are fluctuations caused by channel
characteristics, which cannot be reduced unless averaged
over a longer time, and fluctuations caused by monitoring
estimation uncertainty, which can only be reduced by
increasing the block length. In the experiment, we run the
system at a repetition rate of 25MHz. At this rate, we can
potentially check the link security 250 times per second
with a data block length of 105 and a pulse width of 10 ns.
The performance in the initial experiment is limited by
the connection between the scope and the PC, taking 8 s
to transfer 1 second’s worth of data. To overcome this, we
run the system overnight for 12 h with T equal to 0.1, i.e.,
with the loss of the VOA equal to 10 dB. The results are
plotted in Fig. 5a–c.
Robust performance and 1% fibre tapping attack detection
The results have been normalized to snu. In Fig. 5a, we
plot the received quantum signal modulation variance, the
input signal, and also the LO fluctuations. The received
average difference between the two quantum states is 2ffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
snu
p
, i.e., a modulation variance of 2 snu after channel
Signal waveform
Classical
signal
Quantum-
modulated
signal
Displacement ∆
2
Fig. 3 Phase-space illustration of displaced two-state modulation and the signal waveform. 2ɑ is the difference between the two displaced
coherent states alpha and beta. This is equivalent to two-state modulation with a modulation variance of 2ɑ2. The variance of the one coherent state,
which is represented by a Gaussian distribution, is one shot noise unit. The slots for the SCM and CCM are deterministic, and the shown signal pattern
is repeated over time. The first time slot is for the CCM, where on-off keying is employed to encode 10 bits. The next two slots are for the SCM, where
two quantum states are transmitted. The first quantum state, alpha, has a slightly larger amplitude than the second state, beta
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loss. The fluctuations of the signal and LO pulse power
have been normalized and also plotted. The real-time loss
and excess noise monitoring results obtained by
employing the calculations introduced previously and
removing influential factors are illustrated in Fig. 5b, c.
In Fig. 5b, we present the monitoring results over 12 h;
the mean transmission is 0.10, while the mean excess
quantum noise is 0.1 snu. For clarity, we also illustrate the
smoothed 50-point moving average for both parameters.
From the previous section, for a block length of 105, we
learn that the statistical error of 6.5 standard deviations
for the excess quantum noise is 1 snu, which is even larger
than the measured value (±0.78 snu). Hence, we can infer
that the fluctuations in the measured excess quantum
noise are mainly caused by the statistical estimation.
However, for channel transmission monitoring, the
measured standard deviation is ±0.1 dB, while the statis-
tical accuracy is only approximately ±0.4% (0.02 dB) when
the channel loss is 10 dB. Hence, we can estimate that the
transmission deviation of the channel over 8 s is
approximately ΔT= 0.08 dB when T= 10 dB. This indi-
cates that the monitoring uncertainty comprises only a
small part of the measurement fluctuations.
We also demonstrate a sophisticated fibre tapping
attack by adding a 1/99 splitter into the emulated channel
for 4000 s. As seen from Fig. 5b, between hour 6 and hour
8, the average link transmission drops significantly for
4000 s, indicating a possible fiber tapping attack. The
alarm thresholds for 1% fibre tapping and a 0.5 snu
increase in excess quantum noise are also shown. The
fibre tapping alarm threshold is triggered when the
moving average of the transmission crosses the threshold
for a certain period. We cannot detect the attack from the
excess quantum noise because it is calculated in reference
to Alice’s side, where the influence of the channel
transmission is cancelled out. However, we can still
detect the attack from the channel transmission mon-
itoring results. Notably, if an eavesdropper were to
attempt to resend a classical signal of zero, we would still
see a drop in the channel transmission. In addition, if a
sophisticated eavesdropper were to measure the quantum
signal and resend a replica, i.e., perform an intercept-
resend attack, we would witness an increase of two shot
noise units in the excess noise monitoring results. Thus,
one can identify and characterize an attack by detecting
different statistical characteristics of our monitoring
result distributions.
A good quantum monitoring protocol should enable
Alice and Bob to communicate their entire message
when there is no eavesdropper, i.e., avoid false alarms,
and to lose only a small amount of information when
there is an eavesdropper, i.e., achieve quick response.
This could be accomplished by exploring various meth-
ods of statistical change point detection48, e.g., Bayesian
Oscilloscope
Heterodyne
detection
90° hybridBob
VOA
Emulated
channel
Alice FMPBS
1:99AM
AM 10:90
ATT
PIN
PIN
AWG
50:50
Laser
Fig. 4 Proof-of-principle experimental set-up. AM: amplitude modulator, VOA: variable optical attenuator, ATT: attenuator, PBS: polarization beam
splitter, FM: Faraday mirror. A 1550 nm CW laser is used to generate both the QA signal and LO light pulses with a slot repetition rate of 25 MHz. On
the signal path, an amplitude modulator is used to generate the two-state modulated SCM signal as well as the on-off keying data in the slot for
classical communication (CCM). The light is then attenuated to reduce the difference between the two states for quantum level modulation. A 10/
90 splitter is used to split off 10% of both the QA signal light and the LO light for power monitoring by a photodiode. A variable optical attenuator is
employed for channel emulation. For the LO path, the CW laser is pulsed at the same repetition rate. A Faraday mirror and a delay line are added to
stabilize the LO polarization and match the LO pulse and QA signal pulse at the receiver. The heterodyne detector measures both the X and P
quadratures of the QA signal. The oscilloscope records the measured quadrature components and also the LO and signal power fluctuations
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change point detection49, a supervised learning algo-
rithm50, or CUSUM51. In the Supplementary Informa-
tion, we analyse one method using the moving average.
In the illustrated experimental results, we can thus be
more than 99.96% sure that the detected event is caused
by an eavesdropper, with the QA system taking less than
0.2 s to detect the attack. This result is impressive, as the
QA system detects a small change of 0.1% with a very fast
response when the channel loss changes from 10% to
9.9% by processing the quantum modulation variance,
while the average number of received photons is more
than 30,000 per pulse.
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Fig. 5 Experimental results of the system performance and 1% fibre tapping attack detection. a Received signal, input power fluctuations and
LO power fluctuations over 12h. Each point is calculated as an average of 105 pulses. For each pulse, we acquire one point and plot all measured
quantum modulation variance averages. The data are collected every 8s for 12h. The LO power and input power fluctuations are also plotted with a
block size of 105. The power is normalized to their mean value. b Channel transmission monitoring results and 1% fibre tapping attack
demonstration. The blue dots show the actual monitoring results when the block size is 105, while the solid line shows the moving average of 50
rounds. The red dashed line is the 1% alarm threshold. A fibre tapping attack is demonstrated between hours 6 and 8. c Excess quantum noise
monitoring results. The mean system excess noise is 0.1 snu. The 0.5 snu alarm threshold is also depicted
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Discussion
We have presented a new application of a quantum
communication system, i.e., a quantum alarm (QA) sys-
tem. It is able to detect all classes of known physical layer
attacks that target classical communications links,
including eavesdropping and jamming attacks, and can
achieve a much faster security monitoring response than
classical methods with very high accuracy, better than 0.02
dB at 200 km for loss monitoring, which is much higher
than the accuracy of classical methods (±0.1 dB at 50 km)1,
and better than 0.2 snu for excess quantum noise mon-
itoring. In this work, a QA system has been implemented
using a technique based on CV quantum communications.
A QA system solely monitors a quantum signal for sus-
picious changes. As a result, in comparison to a CV-QKD
system (which is very sensitive to excess channel noise and
receiver system noise52 and has relatively high requirements
in terms of the system properties), a QA system is poten-
tially more compatible with current optical infrastructure,
e.g., the use of optical amplifiers and DWDM. In addition, a
QA system can be easily introduced for high-data-rate
communication links of up to hundreds of kilometres in
length. Security is achieved on the basis of identifying sta-
tistical changes in the received quantum states.
We have demonstrated the first working system using
this technique to protect a Gbps classical communication
link with a channel loss of up to 10 dB and stable per-
formance over up to 12 h. We have performed a classical
fibre tapping attack of 1%, which can be precisely detected
by the QA system. In practice, by adjusting the mon-
itoring block length, the ratio between the numbers of
slots for security checking and classical communication,
which determines the accuracy of attack identification and
the time taken to identify an attack, can be adjusted for
different application requirements. Compared to QKD, in
which a very long block length is required for channel
estimation, a relatively short block length of 105 can
enable fast reaction to attacks.
QKD was proposed in response to the vulnerabilities of
conventional cryptography in the face of future technol-
ogy, i.e., quantum computers. However, practical chal-
lenges53, e.g., the key rate at a long distance, the system
complexity and the incompatibility with current optical
networks, still restrict the use of QKD methods in current
large-scale optical communication networks. In addition,
current eavesdroppers still rely on classical attack meth-
ods, which unavoidably introduce noise and a consider-
able level of additional loss. The QA technique provides
another option for protecting information secrecy by
ensuring physical layer security. Future technical
advancements may enable Eve to deploy a highly sensitive
detection system that will allow her to circumvent the
eavesdropping detection threshold of a QA system, thus
making the current proposal ineffective. However, future
QA systems will also be able to utilize other technological
advancements, such as ultra-low-noise lasers, homodyne
detectors and highly parallel data processing for para-
meter estimation from very large data samples, to improve
the detection sensitivity.
In practice, a QA system can be used in cooperation
with other encryption methods to minimize the infor-
mation obtained by an eavesdropper before the triggering
threshold is reached. Various statistical change point
detection methods can also be explored for attack
detection in QA systems. In addition, the merits of
compact classical transceivers, e.g., small-form-factor
pluggable transceivers, can also be exploited for QA
commericialization.
Methodology
Parameter estimation
Specifically, Bob first compares the quadrature he
measures with Alice’s and then estimates the covariance
matrix of the shared states. This is accomplished by
means of the following linear model, in which Alice’s
quadrature values xi¼1¼m and Bob’s received quadrature
values yi¼1¼m are linked through39:
yi ¼ txi þ z ð5Þ
where t ¼ ffiffiffiffiffiffiTηp and z follows a centered normal
distribution with unknown variance σ2 ¼ 1þ ηTξ þ Vele.
Note that for simplicity, xi¼1¼m and yi¼1¼m represent all
of the quadrature values that Alice and Bob share,
including both the X and P quadratures. In addition,
η and Vele are the efficiency and electronic noise variance,
respectively, of the receiver. The channel transmission
T and the excess noise ξ can be expressed as shown in the
following equations:
T ¼ xiy
2
i
ηVarðxiÞ2
ð6Þ
ξ ¼ VarðyiÞ
ηT^
 Var xið Þ  N0
ηT^
 Vele
ηT^
ð7Þ
Hence, based on these equations, these two parameters
can be estimated and regularly monitored by Bob by
performing real-time post-processing of the measurement
outcomes associated with the quantum signals.
Finite size effect
In the system, the correlated data obtained by Alice and
Bob, ðxi; yiÞi ¼ 1:::m, are linked through:
yi ¼ txi þ z ð8Þ
where t ¼ ffiffiffiffiffiffiTηp and z follows a centred normal distribu-
tion with unknown variance σ2 ¼ 1þ ηT ξ þ Vele.
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Unbiased estimators t^ and σ^2 are known for the normal
linear model:
t^ ¼
Pm
i¼1 xiyiPm
i¼1 x
2
i
ð9Þ
σ^2 ¼ 1
m
Xm
i¼1
ðyi  t^xiÞ2 ð10Þ
where m is the number of data encoded. The maximum-
likelihood estimator t^ follows a normal distribution, and σ^
has a chi-squared distribution:
t^  N t; σPm
i¼1 x
2
i
 
ð11Þ
mσ^2
σ2
 χ2ðm 1Þ ð12Þ
The accuracy of the estimation can be analysed simply
by calculating the confidence intervals of t and σ:
t  t^  ZϵPE
2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
σ2
mVA
s
; t^ þ Z
ϵPE=2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
σ2
mVA
s !
ð13Þ
σ2  σ^2  ZϵPE
2
σ2
ffiffiffi
2
pffiffiffiffi
m
p ; σ^2 þ ZϵPE
2
σ2
ffiffiffi
2
pffiffiffiffi
m
p
 
ð14Þ
where VA is the modulation variance of the quantum
signal Var(xi) and ZϵPE
2
is the confidence level. We can thus
write the estimated upper and lower bounds on the two
monitoring parameters as follows:
T  t^  ZϵPE
2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
σ2
mVA
s !2
=η; t^ þ ZϵPE
2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
σ2
mVA
s !2
=η
2
4
3
5
ð15Þ
ξ  ξ^  ZϵPE
2
σ2
ffiffiffi
2
p
Tη
ffiffiffiffi
m
p ; ξ^ þ ZϵPE
2
σ2
ffiffiffi
2
p
Tη
ffiffiffiffi
m
p
 
ð16Þ
Experimental set-up
As illustrated in Fig. 4, on Alice’s side, a 1550 nm
continuous-wave (CW) laser source is split into two paths:
the signal path and the LO path. For the signal path, each
light pulse is 10 ns long, with a repetition rate of 25 MHz.
In addition, for the classical signal, we use binary intensity
modulation. Hence, the quantum and classical signals are
generated using one amplitude modulator. The data pat-
terns are illustrated in Fig. 5b, where the classical signal
and the quantum-modulated signal, states alpha and beta,
are transmitted sequentially. It should be noted that the
classical signal has a higher bandwidth and that 10 bits are
transmitted in the time taken for one of the quantum
pulses, with a data rate of 1 Gb/s. A 10/90 splitter directs
90% of the input light to a photodiode that continuously
measures and monitors the input power fluctuations. The
remaining optical signal is attenuated to 1 μW before
being connected to a variable attenuator, which is used to
emulate the channel. The LO light is also modulated by an
amplitude modulator to generate a pulsed signal with the
same repetition rate and pulse width as the signal.
Because the LO light and signal pulses originate from the
same laser, the signal and LO pulses are coherent and
cause minimal detection-induced noise. In this initial
experiment, for simplicity, the LO signal is sent along a
separate path. To avoid time delay mismatch, the LO path
is engineered to be the same length as the signal path
through the insertion of a variable fibre delay. All of the
components in the set-up are polarization-maintaining
components to ensure stable detection of the quantum
signal.
On the receiver side, a heterodyne receiver is used that
consists of one 90-degree optical hybrid detector and two
balanced detectors. The balanced detectors are homodyne
detectors intended for classical coherent communication,
with an input power limit of 5 mW. The heterodyne
detector measures both the X and P quadratures of the
received signal. As illustrated in Fig. 4a, since the two-
state quantum signal is displaced in the phase space,
the modulation can be seen as unidimensional, and
the quantum information is stored in the amplitude of the
quantum states. Although the relative phase of the
quantum state and the LO reference will vary along
the channel, we can thus measure the encoded variables
by simply taking the magnitude of the vector sum of the
two measured quadratures at the receiver. In addition, the
LO power is approximately 300 μW, which results in a
photon number of 108 photons per pulse. The level of the
displaced quantum signal is reduced to approximately
1 μW (−30 dBm) before the emulated channel.
Acknowledgements
This work has been funded by the UK EPSRC under the UK Quantum
Technology Hub for Quantum Communications Technologies EP/M013472/1
and the EPSRC Quantum Communications Hub EP/T001011/1.
Author details
1Centre for Advanced Photonics and Electronics, University of Cambridge, 9 JJ
Thomson Ave, Cambridge CB3 0FA, UK. 2Quantum Communications Hub,
Information Centre, Department of Physics, University of York, York YO10 5DD,
UK. 3University of Bath, Claverton Down, Bath BA2 7AY, UK
Author contributions
Y.G. performed the experiment. R.K. and A.W. assisted with the set-up. Y.G.
analysed the data. Y.G., R.K., A.W., R.V.P. and I.H.W. designed the system. A.W.,
R.P. and I.W. provided scientific expertise in classical communication. R.K.
provided scientific expertise in quantum communication. R.P. and I.W.
supervised the project. Y.G. wrote the manuscript, with contributions from all
authors.
Gong et al. Light: Science & Applications           (2020) 9:170 Page 9 of 10
Data availability
Additional data related to this publication is available at https://doi.org/
10.17863/CAM.56391.
Conflict of interest
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
Supplementary information is available for this paper at https://doi.org/
10.1038/s41377-020-00409-1.
Received: 1 March 2020 Revised: 7 September 2020 Accepted: 21
September 2020
References
1. Furdek, M. & Skorin-Kapov, N. Physical-layer attacks in all-optical WDM net-
works. In 2011 Proceedings of the 34th International Convention MIPRO (2011).
2. Hui, R. Q. & O’Sullivan, M. Optical system performance measurements. In Fiber
Optic Measurement Techniques (eds Hui, R. Q. & O’Sullivan, M.) 481–630
(Academic Press, Boston, 2009).
3. Chan, C. C. K. Optical Performance Monitoring: Advanced Techniques for Next-
Generation Photonic Networks. (Academic Press, Burlington, 2010).
4. Shim, H. K et al.Demonstration of correlation-based OTDR for in-service
monitoring of 64-split TDM PON Proceedings of OFC/NFOEC. (IEEE: Los
Angeles, CA, USA, 2012)..
5. Mata, J. et al. Artificial intelligence (AI) methods in optical networks: a com-
prehensive survey. Opt. Switching Netw. 28, 43–57 (2018).
6. Skorin-Kapov, N. et al. Physical-layer security in evolving optical networks. IEEE
Commun. Mag. 54, 110–117 (2016).
7. Iqbal, M. Z., Fathallah, H. & Belhadj, N. Optical fiber tapping: methods and
precautions. Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on High-capacity
Optical Networks and Emerging Technologies. (IEEE, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2011).
8. Fok, M. P. et al. Optical layer security in fiber-optic networks. IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensics Security 6, 725–736 (2011).
9. Medard, M., Chinn, S. R. & Saengudomlert, P. Attack detection in all-optical
networks. In Proceedings of OFC 1998, OSA Technical Digest Series Vol.2. (IEEE,
San Jose, CA, USA, 1998).
10. Skorin-Kapov, N., Chen, J. J. & Wosinska, L. A new approach to optical networks
security: attack-aware routing and wavelength assignment. IEEE/ACM Trans.
Netw. 18, 750–760 (2010).
11. Shaneman, K. & Gray, S. Optical network security: technical analysis of fiber
tapping mechanisms and methods for detection & prevention. Proceedings of
IEEE MILCOM, 2004. (IEEE, Monterey, CA, USA, 2004).
12. Eraerds, P. et al. Photon counting OTDR: advantages and limitations. J. Light-
wave Technol. 28, 952–964 (2010).
13. Bennett, C. H. & Brassard, G. Quantum public key distribution reinvented. ACM
SIGACT N. 18, 51–53 (1987).
14. Pirandola, S. et al. Advances in quantum cryptography. Adv. Opt. Photonics
https://doi.org/10.1364/AOP.361502 (2020).
15. Qi, R. Y. et al. Implementation and security analysis of practical quantum
secure direct communication. Light Sci. Appl. 8, 22 (2019).
16. Long, G. L. & Liu, X. S. Theoretically efficient high-capacity quantum-key-
distribution scheme. Phys. Rev. A65, 032302 (2002).
17. Deng, F. G., Long, G. L. & Liu, X. S. Two-step quantum direct communication
protocol using the einstein-podolsky-rosen pair block. Phys. Rev. A68, 042317
(2003).
18. Humble, T. S. Quantum security for the physical layer. IEEE Commun. Mag. 51,
56–62 (2013).
19. Gisin, N. et al. Trojan-horse attacks on quantum-key-distribution systems. Phys.
Rev. A73, 022320 (2006).
20. Lodewyck, J. et al. Experimental implementation of non-gaussian attacks on a
continuous-variable quantum key distribution system. Proceedings of 2007
Quantum Electronics and Laser Science Conference. (IEEE, Baltimore, MD, USA,
2007).
21. Wootters, W. K. & Zurek, W. H. A single quantum cannot be cloned. Nature
299, 802–803 (1982).
22. Hu, J. Y. et al. Experimental quantum secure direct communication with single
photons. Light Sci. Appl. 5, e16144 (2016).
23. Wu, J. W. et al. Security of quantum secure direct communication based on
wyner’s wiretap channel theory. Quantum Eng. 1, e26 (2019).
24. Sasaki, M. et al. Quantum photonic network: concept, basic tools, and future
issues. IEEE J. Sel. Top. Quantum Electron. 21, 6400313 (2015).
25. Lum, D. J. et al. Quantum enigma machine: Experimentally demonstrating
quantum data locking. Phys. Rev. A94, 022315 (2016).
26. Pirandola, S. et al. Confidential direct communications: a quantum approach
using continuous variables. IEEE J. Sel. Top. Quantum Electron. 15, 1570–1580
(2009).
27. Adesso, G., Ragy, S. & Lee, A. R. Continuous variable quantum information:
gaussian states and beyond. Open Syst. Inf. Dyn. 21, 1440001 (2014).
28. Shapiro, J. H. et al. Quantum low probability of intercept. 2019 Conference on
Lasers and Electro-Optics (CLEO) 1–2 (San Jose, CA, USA, 2019), https://doi.org/
10.1364/CLEO_QELS.2019.FTh4A.2.
29. Lindsey, W. C. Transmission of classical information over noisy quantum
channels–a spectrum approach. IEEE J. Sel. Areas Commun. 38, 427–438
(2020).
30. Grosshans, F. & Grangier, P. Continuous variable quantum cryptography using
coherent states. Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 057902 (2002).
31. Qi, B. Simultaneous classical communication and quantum key distribution
using continuous variables. Phys. Rev. A94, 042340 (2016).
32. Kumar, R. et al. Experimental demonstration of single-shot quantum and
classical signal transmission on single wavelength optical pulse. Sci. Rep. 9,
11190 (2019).
33. Qi, B. et al. Generating the local oscillator “locally” in continuous-variable
quantum key distribution based on coherent detection. Phys. Rev. X5, 041009
(2015).
34. Leverrier, A. et al. Multidimensional reconciliation for a continuous-variable
quantum key distribution. Phys. Rev. A77, 042325 (2008).
35. Jouguet, P. et al. Experimental demonstration of long-distance continuous-
variable quantum key distribution. Nat. Photonics 7, 378–381 (2013).
36. Ghorai, S. et al. Asymptotic security of continuous-variable quantum key dis-
tribution with a discrete modulation. Phys. Rev. X9, 021059 (2019).
37. Cerf, N. J., Lévy, M. & van Assche, G. Quantum distribution of Gaussian keys
using squeezed states. Phys. Rev. A63, 052311 (2001).
38. Paris, M. G. A. Displacement operator by beam splitter. Phys. Lett. A217, 78–80
(1996).
39. Leverrier, A., Grosshans, F. & Grangier, P. Finite-size analysis of a continuous-
variable quantum key distribution. Phys. Rev. A81, 062343 (2010).
40. Fossier, S. et al. Improvement of continuous-variable quantum key distribution
systems by using optical preamplifiers. J. Phys. B: At.,Mol. Optical Phys. 42,
114014 (2009).
41. Zavatta, A., Fiurášek, J. & Bellini, M. A high-fidelity noiseless amplifier for
quantum light states. Nat. Photonics 5, 52–56 (2011).
42. Fasel, S. et al. Quantum cloning with an optical fiber amplifier. Phys. Rev. Lett.
89, 107901 (2002).
43. Caves, C. M. Quantum limits on noise in linear amplifiers. Phys. Rev. D26,
1817–1839 (1982).
44. Tong, Z. et al. Towards ultrasensitive optical links enabled by low-noise phase-
sensitive amplifiers. Nat. Photonics 5, 430–436 (2011).
45. Ou, Z. Y., Pereira, S. F. & Kimble, H. J.Quantum noise reduction in optical
amplification. Phys. Rev. Lett. 70, 3239–3242 (1993).
46. Leverrier, A. & Grangier, P. Continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution
protocols with a non-Gaussian modulation. Phys. Rev. A83, 042312
(2011).
47. Zhao, Y. B. et al. Asymptotic security of binary modulated continuous-variable
quantum key distribution under collective attacks. Phys. Rev. A79, 012307
(2009).
48. Aminikhanghahi, S. & Cook, D. J. A survey of methods for time series change
point detection. Knowl. Inf. Syst. 51, 339–367 (2017).
49. Adams, R. P. & MacKay, D. J. C. Bayesian online changepoint detection. Preprint
at https://arxiv.org/abs/0710.3742 (2007).
50. Li, F., Runger, G. C. & Tuv, E. Supervised learning for change-point detection.
Int. J. Prod. Res. 44, 2853–2868 (2006).
51. Severo, M. & Gama, J. Change detection with kalman filter and cusum. In
Ubiquitous Knowledge Discovery: Challenges, Techniques, Applications (eds May,
A. & Saitta, L.) (Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006).
52. Huang, D. et al. Long-distance continuous-variable quantum key distribution
by controlling excess noise. Sci. Rep. 6, 19201 (2016).
53. Diamanti, E. et al. Practical challenges in quantum key distribution. npj
Quantum Inf. 2, 16025 (2016).
Gong et al. Light: Science & Applications           (2020) 9:170 Page 10 of 10
